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In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) provides comprehensive rules for the processing of personal 
data. In addition, the EU lawmaker intends to adopt specific rules 
to protect confidentiality of communications, in a separate ePrivacy 
Regulation. Some have argued that there is no need for such additional 
rules for communications confidentiality. 
This Article discusses the protection of the right to confidentiality 
of communications in Europe. We look at the right’s origins to assess 
the rationale for protecting it. We also analyze how the right is 
currently protected under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and under EU law. 
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We show that at its core the right to communications confidentiality 
protects three individual and collective values: privacy, freedom of 
expression, and trust in communication services. The right aims 
to ensure that individuals and organizations can safely entrust 
communication to service providers. Initially, the right protected 
only postal letters, but it has gradually developed into a strong 
safeguard for the protection of confidentiality of communications, 
regardless of the technology used. 
Hence, the right does not merely serve individual privacy interests, 
but also other more collective interests that are crucial for the 
functioning of our information society. We conclude that separate 
EU rules to protect communications confidentiality, next to the GDPR, 
are justified and necessary. 
IntroductIon
This Article discusses the protection of the right to confidentiality of 
communications in Europe. In 2017, the European Commission published 
a proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation, which includes rules to protect the 
confidentiality of electronic communications.1 Some have argued that there 
is no need for an ePrivacy Regulation, because the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), is sufficient to protect privacy.2 
This Article focuses on the following questions: What is the right to 
communications confidentiality, and what is the right’s scope? What is the 
rationale for the right to communications confidentiality and how is the right 
protected in current European law? Are separate EU rules, in addition to the 
GDPR, needed to protect the confidentiality of communications? We focus 
on electronic communications. National rules are outside the scope of this 
Article.3
1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal Data in 
Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation 
on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 
2017), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/proposal-regulation-
privacy-and-electronic-communications [hereinafter ePrivacy Proposal 2017].
2 For instance, 63.4% of industry respondents to the consultation by the European 
Commission see no need for special rules for the electronic communications 
sector on confidentiality of electronic communications. See id. at ¶ 3.2.
3 On the law on confidentiality in the UK and the U.S., see Daniel J. Solove & 
Neil M. Richards, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 
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In Part I, we explore the right’s origins and the rationale for protecting 
communications confidentiality. We argue that communications confidentiality 
is important, not only because it protects privacy but also because it protects 
other key values for the information society. By ensuring that individuals 
and businesses can freely exchange information and ideas with others, the 
right protects certain aspects of freedom of expression. Moreover, the right 
aims to ensure that information of any nature can be safely entrusted to 
communication service providers. Such trust in communication services is 
not only important to protect individual rights such as privacy and freedom 
of expression, but also for the proper functioning of our information society. 
Parts II and III turn to current law. For readers who are not familiar with 
the complicated human rights regime in Europe, we introduce the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in Part II. We also introduce the European Union, its Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, its Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
and its ePrivacy rules. 
Part III analyzes the scope of the right to communications confidentiality 
under the European Convention on Human Rights and under EU law. We 
discuss the following aspects: (A) To which technologies does the right 
apply? (B) Do communications have to be private to qualify for protection? 
(C) To what extent does the right to communications confidentiality protect 
metadata? (D) Does the right still apply after the transmission has ended? 
We conclude that separate EU rules to protect the right to communications 
confidentiality are not only justified, but also necessary.
I. FoundatIons oF the rIght to communIcatIons 
conFIdentIalIty
A. Historical Roots of the Right to Communications Confidentiality
Almost all European constitutions contain a right protecting the confidentiality 
of communications.4 As a constitutional right, communications confidentiality 
is connected to the former state postal monopoly. The history of the post is 
96 Geo. Wash. L.J. 123 (2007). 
4 See, e.g., 1831 ConsT. art. 22 (Belg.); Gw. [constitution] art. 13 (Neth.); GG 
[Constitution] art. 10 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/GG.pdf; 
art. 15 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). On communications confidentiality in national 
constitutions, see also Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. Pa. 
J. InT’l L. 483 (2016). See European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on the 
Proposal on Privacy and Electronic Communications (ePrivacy Regulations), 
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similar in the whole of Europe.5 In the Middle Ages, the right to provide 
postal services was seen as a regal privilege, like the right of coinage. As 
with other privileges, the commercial exploitation of the postal right was first 
entrusted to private parties, such as the House of Thurn und Taxis which built 
an extensive postal network, covering large parts of Europe.6 
However, kings and princes realized that the postal service was a lucrative 
source of income and started to nationalize it. King Louis XI of France was 
the first to do so (in 1464). 7 In other countries this example was followed. 
This was the beginning of a long tradition in which the provision of postal 
services, and later also telecommunications services, was seen as an exclusive 
government task. 
The post was already safeguarded by special guarantees with regard to 
confidentiality and security before it became an exclusive government task.8 
This protection was not so much established for the protection of secrets of 
the heart revealed in letters, but rather for the benefit of trust in trade.9 The 
rise of the post coincides with the rise of trade and trade fairs in the early 
Middle Ages. Tradesmen needed a periodical provision of information about 
what was happening in the important European trading centers. The post 
constituted the main infrastructure for the exchange of trade information.
The postal monopoly enabled the state to intercept letters. Indeed, before 
the French Revolution, authorities in Europe had habitually read the letters 
that were entrusted to the state postal service.10 Given the significance of the 
post as infrastructure for the provision of information, this can be regarded 
as a counterpart to the censorship of print that was common in Europe at 
6/2017 (Apr. 24, 2017), https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-04-24_
eprivacy_en.pdf [hereinafter European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion]. 
5 See Johannes hofman, VerTrouweliJke communicaTie: een rechTsVerGeliJkende 
sTudie oVer de GeheimhoudinG Van communicaTie in GrondrechTeliJk 
PersPecTief naar inTernaTionaal, nederlands en duiTs rechT [confidenTial 
communicaTion: a comParaTiVe sTudy on The confidenTialiTy of communicaTions 
in consTiTuTional PersPecTiVe in inTernaTional, duTch and German law] 13-45 
(1995). 
6 Id. 
7 Id.
8 Paulus Van der Velden, heT Geheim der brieVen aan de Geschiedenis en aan 
de beGinselen Van heT sTaaTs- en sTrafreGT GeToeTsT [The secreT of leTTers 
TesTed aGainsT The hisTory and The PrinciPles of consTiTuTional and Penal 
law] 102 (1859).
9 See Hofman, supra note 5, at 23.
10 See daVid kahn, The codebreakers: The comPrehensiVe hisTory of secreT 
communicaTion from ancienT Times To The inTerneT (1996). 
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that time, with which the absolutist rulers of the time tried to prevent the 
distribution of unwelcome information and opinions.11 The fact that the state 
monopolized the post was decisive for the recognition of communications 
confidentiality as a constitutional right. 
In response to the large-scale government interception of letters, a right to 
confidentiality of correspondence was first included in a number of preliminary 
drafts of the French Declaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 
1789.12 The drafters of the Declaration did not see the right to confidentiality 
of correspondence as a privacy-related right. As Ruiz notes, “[w]hen the 
secrecy of telecommunications first arose as a constitutional right it was not 
openly regarded as an aspect of the right to privacy, but as an aspect of the 
freedom of opinion and of expression.”13 The right was “regarded as an aspect 
of individual freedom and, in particular, as inherent to the freedom to express 
one’s opinions via the post.”14 The final version of the Declaration, however, 
did not include a right to confidentiality of correspondence. According to 
Ruiz, a separate confidentiality right “was finally considered redundant and 
thus excluded from the final version of the Declaration of 1789: this right 
was seen implicitly in the recognition in art. 11 of the freedom to express 
one’s opinion in writing.”15 
11 For a historical overview of censorship, see Egbert Dommering, Grensoverschrijdende 
censuur: het EHRM en oude en nieuwe media [Crossborder Censorship: The 
ECtHR and Old and New Media], 2013 auTeurs & média 177; Jan corbeT eT 
al., censures: acTes du colloque du 16 mai 2003 [censorshiP: rePorT of The 
conference of 16 may 2003] (2003). On the history of the legal protection of 
confidentiality of communications, see wilfred sTeenbruGGen, Publieke dimensies 
Van PriVé-communicaTie: een onderzoek naar de VeranTwoordeliJkheid 
Van de oVerheid biJ de bescherminG Van VerTrouweliJke communicaTie in 
heT diGiTale TiJdPerk (2009) [Public Dimensions of Private Communication: 
An Investigation Into the Responsibility of the Government in the Protection 
of Confidential Communications in the Digital Age], https://pure.uva.nl/ws/
files/752230/70945_proefschrift.pdf. Hofman, supra note 5, at 23; blanca ruiz, 
PriVacy in TelecommunicaTions: a euroPean and an american aPProach 64-70 
(1997); axel arnbak, securinG PriVaTe communicaTions: ProTecTinG PriVaTe 
communicaTions securiTy in eu law — fundamenTal riGhTs, funcTional Value 
chains and markeT incenTiVes (2015), http://dare.uva.nl/search?metis.record.
id=492674.
12 assemblée consTiTuanTe, déclaraTion des droiTs de l’homme eT du ciToyen du 
de 1789 [declaraTion of The riGhTs of man and of The ciTizen of 1789].
13 See ruiz, supra note 11, at 68.
14 Id. at 67.
15 Id. at 68.
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The nineteenth century was the era of the great constitutional codifications 
in Europe. These constitutions aimed at restricting state power and guaranteeing 
civil rights against the state. The right to confidentiality of correspondence 
has been included in most European constitutions from that time as one of 
those classic civil rights that require the state to refrain from intervening in the 
spheres of individuals.16 Since then, most constitutions have not changed much, 
probably because this is difficult to do and often requires a qualified majority 
in and several readings by Parliament. But in some European countries, the 
scope of the constitutional right to confidentiality of communications was 
extended to include the new communication technologies of telephone and 
telegraph, which were also brought under the state monopoly.17 
After World War II, international human right treaties introduced a new 
level of protection of communications confidentiality. In these treaties, 
communications confidentiality was framed as a privacy-related right. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 mentioned privacy, family, 
home and correspondence in one provision.18 A similar right to privacy 
was codified in several human rights treaties such as the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights19 and the 1950 European Convention 
on Human Rights.20 
Since the 1970s, another field of law, related to privacy, has become 
increasingly important: data protection law (comparable with what U.S. 
scholars might call information privacy law).21 In the early 1970s, several 
European countries adopted data protection laws.22 The EU sees a task for itself 
in this field, and in 1995 the EU adopted the Data Protection Directive, which 
contains rules for the processing of personal data.23 The GDPR replaced that 
16 See hofman, supra note 5, at 13-45. 
17 In the Netherlands, for example, the right to secrecy in telephone and telegraph 
was codified in Article 13 of the Dutch Constitution in 1983. See sTeenbruGGen, 
supra note 11, at 242.
18 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 
10, 1948).
19 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171.
20 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5. [Hereinafter ECHR].
21 daniel J. soloVe & Paul schwarTz, informaTion PriVacy law (2017).
22 On the history of the right to protection of personal data, see Gloria González 
fusTer, The emerGence of Personal daTa ProTecTion as a fundamenTal riGhT 
of The eu (2014).
23 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
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directive and aims at more harmonization and a stronger protection against 
unfair processing of personal data.24 
The EU not only aims to protect personal data; it also aims to protect 
the confidentiality of communications. In the 1990s, the EU liberalized the 
telecommunications markets. EU law required member states to phase out 
the state monopoly and to allow free market forces in the telecommunications 
sector.25 As a result, member states lost a large part of their previous powers 
to regulate these markets. The EU stepped in with rules that aim at effective 
competition and at safeguarding interests that cannot be left to free market 
forces, such as communications confidentiality and consumer protection.26 
In 1997, the EU adopted the ISDN Directive,27 which was replaced 
in 2002 by the ePrivacy Directive (last updated in 2009).28 The ePrivacy 
Directive provides, as part of the EU regulatory framework for the electronic 
communications sector, specific rules for confidentiality of communications 
and for other privacy-related subjects in the electronic communications sector. 
The ePrivacy Regulation, proposed in 2017, aims to further harmonize the 
rules regarding communications confidentiality and to broaden the scope of 
these rules to new communication technologies.29 
To sum up: historically, the right to communications confidentiality is tied 
to the former state monopoly on postal and telecommunications services. 
At first, only postal letters were protected, but as telecommunications were 
brought under the scope of the state monopoly, the scope of the right to 
communications confidentiality was extended too. (Part III discusses the scope 
of the right in more detail.) Nowadays, the right is not connected with the 
state monopoly anymore, but is based on other rationales. The next section 
discusses why even after the liberalization of telecommunications services 
it is still important to protect communications confidentiality.
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EU) 
[hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC].
24 Council Regulation 2016/679 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
25 See sTeenbruGGen, supra note 11, at 167.
26 See chrisTian koeniG & andreas barTosch, ec comPeTiTion and 
TelecommunicaTions law (2002). 
27 Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
1997 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy 
in the Telecommunications Sector, 1997 O.J. (L 24) 1.
28 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy 
in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201), revised by Directive 
2009/136/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 [hereinafter Directive 2002/58/EC]. 
29 See ePrivacy Proposal 2017, supra note 1. 
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B. Rationales: Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and Trust
Looking at the origins of the right of communications confidentiality, we can 
distinguish three rationales, which remain valid even after the liberalization of 
the postal and telecommunication markets. These rationales are: (1) privacy, 
(2) freedom of expression, and (3) trust in communication services.
1. Privacy 
Nowadays, privacy is clearly an important rationale for protecting confidentiality 
of communications. Monitoring, listening, or reading people’s communications 
will often involve infringing their privacy. Electronic communications are an 
important means of expressing private thoughts and feelings and developing 
relationships with others. The right to communications confidentiality provides 
a barrier against unwanted access to these private thoughts and feelings, and 
thereby protects individual privacy.30
2. Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression is another important rationale for protecting the right to 
communications confidentiality. Freedom of expression includes the “freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas.”31 The 
ECtHR and the CJEU have confirmed that communications confidentiality 
is important for freedom of expression.32 
However, the relationship between freedom of expression and communications 
confidentiality is complicated. On the one hand, the right to communications 
confidentiality can be seen as an important facilitator of freedom of expression.33 
The right aims to guarantee, for example, that people can freely exchange 
30 See sTeenbruGGen, supra note 11, at 45. 
31 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11, Dec. 7, 2000, 
55 O.J. 391 [hereinafter EU Charter]. See id. at 46-49. 
32 See infra Part III.
33 See also Frank La Rue, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, 20, A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013), www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf. On the 
connection between communications confidentiality and freedom of expression, 
see also sTeenbruGGen, supra note 11, at 46-49; Joris van Hoboken & Frederik 
Zuiderveen Borgesius, Scoping Electronic Communication Privacy Rules: 
Data, Services and Values, 6 J. inTell. ProP. info. Tech. & elecTronic com. l. 
198 (2015). For a U.S. perspective on the connection between confidentiality, 
privacy, and freedom of expression, see neil richards, inTellecTual PriVacy: 
reThinkinG ciVil liberTies in The diGiTal aGe 136-152 (2015). 
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politically sensitive information without fearing interception and prosecution 
by the authorities. 
On the other hand, the right to communications confidentiality may conflict 
with freedom of expression. A conflict could arise, for instance, if a journalist 
wanted to access telephone conversations between U.S. President Trump and 
Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia regarding the disappearance 
of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In such cases, careful consideration must be 
given to whether a conflict actually exists and, if this is indeed the case, it 
must be determined which interest weighs more heavily in the case at hand. 
(Similar conflicts can arise between privacy and freedom of expression).
For this Article, however, we focus on the role of communications 
confidentiality as a facilitator of freedom of expression.
3. Trust in Communication Services 
Next to privacy and freedom of expression, trust in communication services has 
also always been an important rationale for the protection of communications 
confidentiality. As Arnbak notes, “[t]he underlying rationale to warrant such 
protection is that communicants entrust communication to an intermediary, 
thus losing control in relation to the intermediary or third parties.”34 People 
need to be able to trust that their communication is safe in the hands of a 
service provider. That was important under the state monopoly, but it is even 
more so in our interconnected society, which depends heavily on electronic 
communication services for communications, commercial transactions, 
e-government, and democratic participation. 
If people cannot reasonably assume that electronic communication services 
are safe, they are likely to be less willing to use these services. Such a chilling 
effect on communication would threaten not only privacy and freedom of 
expression, but also other rights and freedoms, such as freedom of thought 
and freedom of assembly. Those rights and freedoms would be threatened if 
people’s fear of eavesdropping or surveillance led to their not feeling free to 
discuss their thoughts or their assemblies. 
These three rationales — privacy, freedom of expression, and trust — also 
underlie the protection of communications confidentiality in the ePrivacy 
Regulation. The ePrivacy Regulation is one of the instruments of the European 
Commission’s Digital Single Market strategy, which aims to “to increase 
trust in . . . . digital services.”35 The Commission may have thought mainly 
of the economic dimension of trust. The Parliament, however, stressed that 
34 Arnbak, supra note 11, at 226. See also sTeenbruGGen, supra note 11, at 354.
35 See ePrivacy Proposal 2017, supra note 1, at ¶ 1.1 (explanatory memorandum 
to the proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation). 
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communications confidentiality is important for various other rights and 
interests, and proposed to add to the preamble of the ePrivacy regulation: 
“The protection of confidentiality of communications is an essential condition 
for the respect of other connected fundamental rights and freedoms, such as 
the protection of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of 
assembly, freedom of expression and information.”36 
In sum, protection of communications confidentiality is justified and 
necessary to safeguard not only individual rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression, but also the public interest of trust in communication services. 
II. general Framework on communIcatIons 
conFIdentIalIty In europe 
A. The European Convention on Human Rights 
This Part introduces the general framework for the protection of the right 
to communications confidentiality in Europe, starting with the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In Part III we will further discuss the 
scope of the right to communications confidentiality under ECHR and EU law.
The ECHR was adopted in 1950 by the Council of Europe, an 
intergovernmental organization founded by a number of Western European 
states after World War II, with the aim of international cooperation. Inspired 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Council of Europe drafted 
the ECHR, which codified a series of freedoms and rights, such as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and the prohibition of torture. Now, 
the Council of Europe has 47 member states.37 The ECHR includes a strong 
enforcement structure: after having exhausted national legal remedies, citizens 
in treaty states have the right to file a complaint with the ECtHR, whose 
rulings are binding on the treaty states. Therefore, the ECHR has become an 
important factor in the protection of fundamental rights in Europe.38 
36 Marju Lauristin (Special Rapporteur), Comm. On Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of 
Personal Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 2002/58/
EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM (2017) 0010 
(Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0324+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
37 See Who We Are, council euroPe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-
we-are (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
38 For an extensive introduction into the ECHR, see, for example, Theory and 
PracTice of The euroPean conVenTion on human riGhTs (Pieter van Dijk, Fried 
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Confidentiality of communications is one of the rights guaranteed in 
the ECHR. This right is codified in Article 8 of the ECHR, which grants 
people the right to respect for their private and family life, home, and their 
correspondence: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Before the 1970s, almost all complaints regarding violation of Article 8 of the 
ECHR were declared unfounded. Later, the ECtHR gradually expanded the 
protection offered by Article 8. First, the ECtHR has stated that the ECHR 
provisions must be “interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its 
rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.”39 The meaning 
of the ECHR rights is therefore not fixed. According to the ECtHR, “the 
Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions.”40 The ECtHR says it takes “a pragmatic, common-
sense approach rather than a formalistic or purely legal one.”41 
This dynamic interpretation of the ECtHR has increased the scope of the 
rights in the ECHR, including the right to privacy in Article 8.42 The ECtHR 
has brought all kinds of claims under the protection of Article 8 of the ECHR, 
such as claims regarding formal recognition of a gender change and claims 
for protection against noise or environmental pollution.43
van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn & Leo Zwaak eds., 5th ed. 2018).
39 Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 74; See 
also Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); Armonas v. 
Lithuania, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1526, ¶ 38.
40 Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 39. The Court started 
the “living instrument” approach in Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at ¶ 31 (1978).
41 Botta v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 27. 
42 In this Article, we use “privacy” and “private life” interchangeably. See 
González fusTer, supra note 22, at 82-84, 255 (on the slight difference between 
“private life” and “privacy.”).
43 See Goodwin, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 74; Amann v. Switzerland, 2000-II 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 65. 
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Furthermore, the ECtHR has developed a strict test for limitations on the 
rights of Article 8. The test consists of three steps, which are based on the 
criteria mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 8.44 In a typical case, 
somebody complains that his or her privacy is limited by a state to such an 
extent that the right is violated. In step 1, the ECtHR checks whether the 
limitation of the right to privacy is prescribed by a sufficiently precise law. 
The Court also looks whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse 
and arbitrariness. In step 2, the ECtHR assesses whether the limitation is 
necessary in a democratic society. The ECtHR checks whether the limitation 
serves a pressing social need, and whether principles of proportionality and 
subsidiarity are met. In step 3, the ECtHR checks whether the limitation 
serves one of the legitimate aims (from the second paragraph of Article 8 of 
the ECHR), such as the protection of national security.45 
Sometimes the state must take action to comply with the ECHR. The 
ECtHR has derived from the ECHR not only negative obligations (to refrain 
from action) for the government, but also positive obligations (to take action). 
As the Court puts it:
Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the 
individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it 
does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference; in 
addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive 
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private and family life.46 
States may fail to meet their obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR if 
they do not take sufficient action to protect citizens against infringements 
by other citizens. As the ECtHR puts it, “there may be positive obligations 
inherent in an effective respect for private life. These obligations may involve 
the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even 
in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves . . . .”47 
44 The Court also applies those criteria when dealing with other human rights, in 
particular those in articles 8-11 of the ECHR.
45 See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); Klass 
v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 
30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Silver and others v. United Kingdom, 61 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983); Malone v. United Kingdom, 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1984). 
46 See, e.g., X&Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 23 (1985). 
47 Bărbulescu v Romania, CE:ECHR:2016:0112JUD006149608 (referred to Grand 
Chamber on 6 June 2016). See also Z v. Finland, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 36 
(1997); Mosley v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.774, ¶ 106 (2011).
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Such measures might, for example, involve adopting appropriate laws and 
enforcing them.48 
These positive obligations can lead to a “horizontal” effect of the rights 
in Article 8 of the ECHR.49 A private party cannot sue another private party 
under the ECHR.50 But citizens can complain to the ECtHR if the state fails 
to protect their rights against infringements by other citizens (or companies).51 
This way, fundamental rights also regulate the horizontal relationship between 
individuals. 
The positive obligations also apply to the right to communications 
confidentiality under Article 8 of the ECHR.52 Treaty states must therefore 
actively protect this right. In consideration of the economic and technological 
developments, the right to communications confidentiality can only offer 
effective protection if the state actively takes measures to protect the right, 
also in the sphere of individuals between themselves. Effective protection 
of communications confidentiality is only possible if the law limits what 
communication providers can do with our communications and requires 
such providers to protect our communications against unlawful access by 
third parties. 
There is much debate on the question whether human rights (should) have 
horizontal effect. Some fear that such horizontal application of human rights 
leads to a “devaluation” of these rights.53 For others, it is “self-evident” that 
48 See, e.g., X&Y, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).
49 Jean-françois akandJi-kombe, PosiTiVe obliGaTions under The euroPean 
conVenTion on human riGhTs (2007); Paul De Hert, From the Principle of 
Accountability to System Responsibility? Key Concepts in Data Protection Law 
and Human Rights Law Discussions (Jan. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.vub.ac.be/LSTS/pub/Dehert/410.pdf.
50 ECHR, supra note 20, at art. 34. 
51 The Court says it “does not consider it desirable, let alone necessary, to elaborate 
a general theory concerning the extent to which the Convention guarantees 
should be extended to relations between private individuals inter se.” VGT 
Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 46 (2001).
52 Positive obligations regarding communications confidentiality can already be 
derived from Golder v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975). In this 
case, the Court ruled that the state should take active measures to enable prisoners 
to correspond. See also Cotlet v. Romania, CE:ECHR:2003:0603JUD003856597; 
Craxi v. Italy (No. 2), CE:ECHR:2003:0717JUD002533794. On positive 
obligations and the right of communications confidentiality, see, extensively, 
sTeenbruGGen, supra note 11. 
53 See, e.g., barT Jan de Vos, horizonTale werkinG Van GrondrechTen: een kriTiek 
[horizonTal effecTs of human riGhTs: a criTique] 289-97 (2010).
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human rights have horizontal effect.54 We agree that in modern society, active 
government measures are often indispensable to enable people to enjoy their 
human rights. Regardless of what scholars say on the topic, the ECtHR gives 
human rights a certain horizontal effect via its case-law on positive obligations. 
Because the ECtHR interprets and applies Article 8 of the ECHR generously, 
this provision plays an important role in the protection of the right to privacy 
and communications confidentiality in Europe. We will discuss to a greater 
extent what the scope of protection is in Part III. First, we will introduce the 
other major source of protection of communication confidentiality in Europe. 
B. EU Law
The European Union has 28 member states.55 The origins of the EU lie in the 
postwar situation after World War II when several European countries started 
the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the European Economic 
Community (1957) and the European Atomic Energy Community (1957). 
These treaties primarily aimed at economic cooperation but impacted many 
other policy areas as well. The name of the European Communities was 
changed to European Union in 1993. Each of the EU member states is also a 
member state of the Council of Europe, and party to the ECHR.56 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is based in Luxembourg.57 
The CJEU has the final say on the interpretation of EU law to ensure it is applied 
in the same way in all EU member states. National judges in the EU can, and 
in some cases must, ask the CJEU for advice on how to interpret EU law.58 
54 serGe GuTwirTh, PriVacy and The informaTion aGe 38 (Raf Casert trans., 2001).
55 Soon it is expected to change to 27 member states as the United Kingdom intends 
to leave the EU (Brexit). 
56 Our Member States, council euroPe, http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-
member states (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
57 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 13(1), June 6, 2016, 
2016 O.J. (C 202), 13 [hereinafter TEU].
58 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
art. 267, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 47 [hereinafter TFEU] (establishing 
the preliminary reference procedure that differentiates between the right and 
the duty of national courts to seek a preliminary ruling. Under the discretionary 
reference stipulated in article 267(2), a national “court or tribunal” may ask the 
CJEU to give a preliminary ruling if it considers that a decision on the question 
is “necessary” to enable it to give a judgment in a particular case. The obligatory 
reference (duty to refer) is established in two cases: with respect to national 
courts adjudicating at last instance (Article 267(3)) and with respect to all courts 
faced with a question of the validity of EU law. The obligation of national 
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As said, the original EU treaties focused mostly on economic issues. 
However, the CJEU introduced fundamental rights into EU law judgments 
by accepting them as general principles of EU law in its case-law. The CJEU 
found these principles in the common constitutional traditions of the member 
states and the ECHR.59 The EU is not a party to the ECHR, and therefore 
the CJEU is strictly speaking not bound to follow the interpretation of the 
ECtHR. However, in practice, both courts try to prevent conflicts and diverging 
interpretations, and regularly cite each other’s case law.60
The EU developed its own fundamental rights document: the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was adopted in 2000 
and has been legally binding since 2009.61 The EU Charter contains all of 
the rights of the ECHR and a number of other fundamental rights. (We use 
the phrases “fundamental rights” and “human rights” interchangeably in this 
Article; the difference is minimal.62) EU institutions must comply with the 
EU Charter. Member states must also comply with the EU Charter, if they 
act within the scope of EU law (for example, when they are implementing 
and applying EU directives or regulations).63 
The EU Charter contains two provisions which protect privacy-related 
interests. Article 7 of the EU Charter contains a right to privacy, which copies, 
almost verbatim, Article 8 of the ECHR. The EU Charter uses the more modern 
and technology-neutral term “communications” instead of “correspondence” 
(the word used in the ECHR). Article 7 of the EU Charter reads as follows: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home 
and communications.”
courts of last instance to refer for a preliminary ruling when a question of the 
interpretation of EU law arises is subject to certain exceptions. See also Agne 
Limante, Recent Developments in the Acte Clair Case Law of the EU Court of 
Justice: Towards a More Flexible Approach, 54 J. common mkT. sTud. 1384 
(2016).
59 Case T-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle 
für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, ¶ 4; Case T-4/73, Nold KG v. 
Commission No. 2, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
60 Since 2009, an explicit basis was included in the TEU to enable the EU to join 
the ECHR. However, the CJEU ruled in 2014 that the draft accession agreement 
was not compatible with EU law. See opinion 2/2013, EU:C:2014:2454. It does 
not seem likely that the EU will join the ECHR anytime soon. 
61 See TEU, supra note 57, at art. 6.1. 
62 On the difference between “human rights” and “fundamental rights,” see González 
fusTer, supra note 22, at 82-84, 164-66.
63 Aklagaren v. Akerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105. 
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The EU Charter contains a separate provision that lists the criteria for 
restrictions on its rights.64 These criteria resemble the criteria for restrictions 
in the second paragraph of Article 8 of the ECHR.65 The EU Charter states 
that, insofar as the Charter contains fundamental rights which correspond 
with rights in the ECHR, the meaning and scope of these rights are the same 
as those of the ECHR.66 However, the EU Charter allows the EU to provide 
more protection than the ECHR.67
In addition to this right to privacy, the EU Charter contains a separate 
fundamental right to personal data protection. Article 8 of the EU Charter 
reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority. 
The EU has a long and strong tradition of protecting personal data. The 1995 
Data Protection Directive68 has set the bar for the protection of personal data 
worldwide.69 The General Data Protection Regulation70 replaced the Data 
Protection Directive and the various implementation laws in the member 
states in May 2018. The GDPR contains rules regarding the processing 
of personal data, to give effect to Article 8 of the EU Charter (the right to 
protection of personal data). The GDPR does not aim to protect the right to 
64 EU Charter, supra note 31, at art. 52. See also, Note from the Praesidium, 
comments on Article 7 (Praesidium 2000) (Explanations Relating to the Complete 
Text of the Charter), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf.
65 On the difference between article 52 of the EU Charter and article 8(2) of the 
ECHR, see González fusTer, supra note 22, at 201.
66 EU Charter, supra note 31, at art. 52(3). 
67 Id.
68 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 23.
69 See Michael D. Birnhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a 
Global Regime, 24 comPuTer l. & securiTy reV. 508 (2008); Michael Birnhack, 
Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 yale J.l. & Tech. (2012); 
Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 nw. u. l. reV. 1 (2012). 
70 GDPR, supra note 24. 
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privacy in general, or to protect communications confidentiality (Article 7 
of the EU Charter). 
Since 1997, the EU has set specific rules for the protection of privacy, 
communications confidentiality, and personal data in the electronic 
communications sector. These rules are currently laid down in the ePrivacy 
Directive (last revised in 2009).71 The ePrivacy Directive’s rules complement 
and particularize the general rules on personal data protection.72 The ePrivacy 
Directive’s central provision for the protection of communications confidentiality 
is Article 5(1). In short, Article 5(1) says that member states must guarantee, 
through national law, the confidentiality of communication (and related 
metadata) by means of public electronic communications networks and 
services. Article 5(1) thus contains a positive obligation, a duty of care, for 
member states to protect communications confidentiality. In particular, they 
must prohibit listening, tapping, storage and other kinds of interception or 
surveillance of communications and the related metadata. The provision thus 
emphasizes member states’ positive obligations regarding confidentiality of 
communications.73
The principle of communications confidentiality is further protected by 
other provisions of the ePrivacy Directive, which lay down, for instance, strict 
rules for the processing of the metadata generated by the use of electronic 
communication services (traffic and location data).74 In addition, Article 15 
contains strict requirements for restrictions by member states for national 
security, crime prevention, and similar purposes. These requirements resemble 
the requirements in Article 8(2) of the ECHR. The ePrivacy Directive requires 
member states to transpose its rules into national law and to apply and enforce 
this national law.75 
71 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and 
Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 
Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the 
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 on Cooperation Between National Authorities Responsible 
for the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11.
72 See Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 28, at art. 1(2). 
73 On positive obligations, §II A of this article.
74 See id. at arts. 6, 8-9. 
75 In principle, in the spheres of individuals between themselves, the directive will 
take effect through the national implementation law. Under the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, in principle a private person cannot 
directly invoke a provision of a directive against another private person. Case 
C-91/92 Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl., 1994 E.C.R. I-3325. 
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In 2017, the European Commission published a proposal for a new ePrivacy 
Regulation, which should replace the ePrivacy Directive.76 At the time of 
writing, the ePrivacy proposal is still being discussed in Brussels, and it is 
unclear when it will be adopted.77
III. the scope oF the rIght to communIcatIons 
conFIdentIalIty
In this Part, we analyze the scope of the right to communications confidentiality. 
We discuss the scope of the right under Article 8 of the ECHR on the one 
hand, and under EU law on the other. More specifically, we discuss (A) 
which technologies are protected; (B) whether communications need to be 
private in order to be protected; (C) whether the protection includes content 
only or also the metadata; and (D) whether communication is also protected 
after transmission. 
A. Which Communication Technologies?
Originally, the right to communications confidentiality only applied to postal 
letters. Nowadays, however, people use all kinds of communication technologies 
and services for personal communication. Are all these communication 
technologies protected?
1. Article 8 of the ECHR
As noted above, Article 8 of the ECHR protects “correspondence.” The 
drafters of the ECHR intended to protect letters.78 However, by applying a 
76 ePrivacy Proposal 2017, supra note 1.
77 On 20 October 2017, the European Parliament adopted its position on the 
ePrivacy proposal. Generally speaking, the Parliament’s version is more privacy-
friendly than the Commission’s proposal. Marju Lauristin (Special Rapporteur), 
Comm. On Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning 
the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal Data in Electronic 
Communications and Repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy 
and Electronic Communications), COM (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-
0324+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [hereinafter Parliament Proposal]. 
78 collecTed ediTion of The “TraVaux PréParaToires” of The euroPean conVenTion 
on human riGhTs (Council of Eur. ed., 1975-1985).
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dynamic interpretation, the ECtHR has also brought other communication 
technologies under the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
In 1978, the ECtHR brought phone calls under the scope of Article 8 for 
the first time. The Court ruled that “although telephone conversations are not 
expressly mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 8 . . . . such conversations are 
covered by the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ referred to by 
this provision.”79 Later, the ECtHR used the same approach to bring telexes,80 
pager messages,81 and private radio broadcasting82 within the scope of Article 8 
of the ECHR. And in the 2007 Copland case the ECtHR considered email and 
internet use to be covered by the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence.’83 
In its 2017 Barbulescu judgment, the ECtHR has confirmed that Article 8 
also protects communications via an instant messaging service.84
Hence, the ECtHR has adopted a technology-neutral approach in which 
there is ample room to protect various means of communication under Article 
8 of the ECHR. Indeed, the ECtHR has stated that “Article 8 ECHR protects 
the confidentiality of private communications, whatever the content of the 
correspondence concerned, and whatever form it may take. This means that 
what Article 8 protects is the confidentiality of all the exchanges in which 
79 Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 41 (1978). 
80 Christie v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 21482/93, 78 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 
& Rep. 119 (1994). This was not a judgment by the ECtHR, but a decision of 
the European Commission of Human Rights. Until 1998, the admissibility of a 
complaint was first assessed by the European Commission on Human Rights. Only 
if the Commission concluded that the complaint was sufficiently well-founded 
would the Court deal with it. In 1998, the proceedings before the Commission 
were abolished (Protocol 11 to the ECHR). 
81 Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom, 2002 Eur. Ct. H.R. 691.
82 X and Y v. Belgium, App. No. 8962/80, 28 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 112 
(1982). 
83 Copland v. United Kingdom, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 41: 
According to the Court’s case law, telephone calls from business premises 
are prima facie covered by the notions of “private life” and “correspondence” 
for the purposes of Article 8 . . . . It follows logically that e-mails sent from 
work should be similarly protected under Article 8, as should information 
derived from the monitoring of personal internet usage. 
84 Barbulescu v. Romania, CE:ECHR:2017:0905JUD006149608, ¶ 74. This is a 
Grand Chamber judgment. Judgments by the Grand Chamber have more weight 
than judgments of other chambers of the Court. In exceptional situations, the 
Grand Chamber of the Court decides on cases. ECHR, supra note 20, at arts. 
30, 43. 
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individuals may engage for the purposes of communication.”85 In sum, all 
kinds of communication technologies are protected by Article 8 of the ECHR.
2. EU Law
Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union essentially 
copies Article 8 of the ECHR, while replacing the word “correspondence” 
with “communications.” The EU lawmaker introduced this change in view of 
technological developments and did not intend a material change as compared 
to Article 8 of the ECHR. As the EU Charter aims to give at least as much 
protection as the ECHR,86 it can safely be assumed that Article 7 of the EU 
Charter protects all kinds of personal communication, regardless of the 
technology used. 
The current EU ePrivacy rules, however, have a narrower scope. Many rules 
in the ePrivacy Directive apply only to providers of publicly available electronic 
communications networks and electronic communications services. This also 
goes for Article 5(1), the main provision for communications confidentiality in 
the ePrivacy Directive87 and the rules for processing metadata. An electronic 
communications service is, roughly summarized, a service that consists 
wholly or mainly of the conveyance of signals on electronic communications 
networks.88 In practice, mostly phone companies and internet access providers 
fall within the scope of “electronic communications services.” 
Webmail services (e.g., Gmail), instant messaging services (e.g., WhatsApp), 
and computer-based Voice over IP services (e.g., Skype) are often called 
“over the top” services. Such over the top services are generally assumed to 
fall outside the scope of “electronic communications service” in the ePrivacy 
Directive. Over the top services do not consist of conveying signals on an 
electronic communication network, but are considered to be independent 
services delivered on top of the electronic communication network — users 
85 Michaud v. France, CE:ECHR:2012:1206JUD001232311, ¶ 90 (internal 
citations omitted; emphasis added). See also M.N. and others v. San Marino, 
E:ECHR:2015:0707JUD002800512, ¶ 51-55.
86 See EU Charter, supra note 31, at art. 52. 
87 There is a discussion on the scope of Article 5(1). See sTeenbruGGen, supra note 
11, at 179; frederik zuiderVeen borGesius, imProVinG PriVacy ProTecTion in 
The area of behaVioural TarGeTinG (2015), aT 175; Arnbak, supra note 11.
88 Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 28, at art. 2(c) (referring to the definition in 
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33).
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can access over the top services via the networks provided by their electronic 
communication service providers.89 
While the concept of “electronic communications service” is defined 
narrowly, the EU legislator nevertheless tried to provide reasonably technology-
neutral protection to communications confidentiality. Article 5(1) of the 
ePrivacy Directive requires member states “to ensure the confidentiality of 
communications and the related traffic data [metadata] by means of a public 
communications network and publicly available electronic communications 
services, through national legislation.” The term “communication” is defined 
in the ePrivacy Directive as “any information exchanged or conveyed 
between a finite number of parties by means of a publicly available electronic 
communications service.”90 
Under the ePrivacy Directive, communications confidentiality would 
arguably also apply to forms of communication which traditionally would not 
be seen as personal communications, but rather as mass communications. For 
instance, the definition of communication in the ePrivacy Directive includes 
information by means of a broadcasting service (e.g., TV content) if this 
information can be related to an identifiable subscriber or user receiving the 
information.91 This means that IP-based TV services could also fall within 
the scope of Article 5 of the ePrivacy Directive (and Article 6 which sets 
strict rules for the processing of metadata).92 This shows that the ePrivacy 
Directive grants a rather broad protection to communications confidentiality. 
The 2017 proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation aims to broaden the scope 
of the right to communications confidentiality even further to all current 
and future means of communication, regardless of the technology used. The 
preamble states: “The principle of confidentiality should apply to current and 
future means of communication, This would include calls, internet access, 
89 This may change. For instance, a German judge asked the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling on the question whether a webmail service such as Gmail is an “electronic 
communication service.” EuGH soll Pflichten von Web mail-Anbietern klären, 
JuTsiz-online (Feb. 26 2018), http://www.ovg.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/
pressemitteilungen/05_180226/index.php (Gr.). On over the top services, see 
ilsa GodloViTch eT al., oVer-The-ToP (oTTs) Players: markeT dynamics and 
Policy challenGes (2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
STUD/2015/569979/IPOL_STU(2015)569979_EN.pdf. 
90 See Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 28, at art. 2(d). All kinds of personal 
communication by means of a publicly available electronic communications 
service fall within the scope of “communication,” regardless of the type of 
network used (telecommunications, broadcasting, satellite, etc.).
91 See id. (the second part of the definition of communication).
92 See sTeenbruGGen, supra note 11, at 181, 354. 
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instant messaging applications, e-mail, internet phone calls and personal 
messaging provided through social media.” 93 For that purpose, the notion of 
“electronic communication service” “which is the central notion determining 
the scope of the EU electronic communications framework, is significantly 
broadened and also includes interpersonal communications services, such as 
Voice over IP, messaging services, and web-based e-mail services.94”
Pursuant to the ePrivacy proposal, the right to communications confidentiality 
would even apply to machine-to-machine communications and many Internet 
of Things scenarios.95 This illustrates that the European Commission sees 
communications confidentiality as more than just a privacy right. The right to 
communications confidentiality also aims to promote trust in communications. 
The proposal’s preamble states: 
Connected devices and machines increasingly communicate with 
each other by using electronic communications networks (Internet of 
Things) . . . . In order to ensure full protection of the rights to privacy 
and confidentiality of communications, and to promote a trusted and 
secure Internet of Things in the digital single market, it is necessary to 
clarify that this Regulation should apply to the transmission of machine-
to-machine communications. Therefore, the principle of confidentiality 
enshrined in this Regulation should also apply to the transmission of 
machine-to-machine communications.96
The European Parliament, however, proposed to delete the recital about 
machine-to-machine communications, without offering a clear explanation. It 
remains to be seen to what extent the right to communications confidentiality 
will apply to machine-to-machine communications in the final version of 
the ePrivacy Regulation. While there is still much discussion on what the 
scope should be, so far, the different EU institutions agree that the ePrivacy 
Regulation should have a wider scope than the ePrivacy Directive.97
93 See ePrivacy Proposal 2017, supra note 1, at recital 1. 
94 ePrivacy Proposal 2017, supra note 1, at art. 3(aa). On “electronic communication 
services,” see frederik zuiderVeen borGesius eT al., an assessmenT of The 
commission’s ProPosal on PriVacy and elecTronic communicaTions 35-42 
(2017). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583152/
IPOL_STU(2017)583152_EN.pdf
95 See ePrivacy Proposal 2017, supra note 1, at recital 12. 
96 See id. at recital 12. 
97 The definition of “communication” does not return in the ePrivacy Regulation. 
And the proposal no longer explicitly states that broadcasting services are within 
its scope if the information can be related to an identifiable user. Here, at first 
glance Directive 2002/58/EC seems to be offering more protection. However, 
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In the light of the rationales of the right of communications confidentiality, 
it makes sense to protect confidentiality of communications, regardless of the 
technology.98 Extending the protection of communications confidentiality to 
new communication services is an essential step towards effective protection. 
B. Only Private Communication? 
Communication services are used not only for private communications, but 
also for professional business purposes or to spread public information and 
opinions. We have argued that the right to communications confidentiality 
protects not only privacy, but also freedom of expression and, more generally, 
trust in communication services. This raises the question: does communication 
need to be private, or privacy-related, to be protected? 
1. Article 8 of the ECHR
Case law of the ECtHR shows that the protection of communications 
confidentiality under Article 8 of the ECHR extends beyond the private 
sphere. In its Niemietz case of 1992, the ECtHR brought the seizure of business 
letters by the police under the protection of Article 8. The ECtHR noted that 
Article 8 “does not use, as it does for the word ‘life,’ any adjective to qualify 
the word ‘correspondence.’”99 Correspondence is thus protected, regardless 
of whether it is private. Business emails are also protected, as illustrated by 
the 2017 Barbulescu case.100 
considering that the ePrivacy Regulation proposal generally wants to continue 
or extend the protection of communications confidentiality as compared to 
Directive 2002/58/EC, we assume that such broadcasting services would also 
be covered under the proposal. 
98 Obviously, the ePrivacy rules have a narrower scope than Article 8 of the ECHR 
and Article 7 of the EU Charter, which both apply to all means of personal 
communications, regardless of the technology used. The ePrivacy Directive 
and the proposed ePrivacy Regulation focus on electronic communications; the 
rules do not apply to letters, for instance.
99 Niemietz v. Germany, 251-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 32 (1992) (internal citations 
omitted).
100 Barbulescu v. Romania, CE:ECHR:2017:0905JUD006149608, ¶ 72: 
In a number of cases relating to correspondence with a lawyer, [the Court] has 
not even envisaged the possibility that Article 8 might be inapplicable on the 
ground that the correspondence was of a professional nature. Furthermore, 
it has held that telephone conversations are covered by the notions of 
“private life” and “correspondence” within the meaning of Article 8. In 
principle, this is also true where telephone calls are made from or received 
on business premises. The same applies to emails sent from the workplace, 
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Next to that, the ECtHR has indicated that surveillance of communications 
threatens not only privacy-related interests, but also freedom of expression: the 
“menace of surveillance can be claimed in itself to restrict free communication.”101 
This illustrates that protecting communications confidentiality is about more 
than only protecting privacy-interests. In sum: communication does not need 
to be private to be protected under Article 8 of the ECHR, which is triggered 
by the mere use of a communication technology, regardless of the nature of 
the information that is exchanged. 
2. EU Law
Article 7 of the EU Charter offers at least the same protection as Article 8 of 
the ECHR. The CJEU says that the right to privacy under EU law also extends 
to professional activities, similar to the right in the ECHR.102 
The ePrivacy Directive also protects any information exchanged — private 
or not. Moreover, the ePrivacy Directive aims to protect the interests of 
both natural and legal persons.103 The proposed ePrivacy Regulation takes 
the same approach.104 In this regard, the ePrivacy rules go beyond the scope 
of the GDPR. The GDPR only applies to “personal data,” defined as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (…).”105 
In principle, the GDPR thus does not protect data regarding legal persons.106 
which enjoy similar protection under Article 8, as does information derived 
from the monitoring of a person’s internet use (internal citations omitted). 
101 See Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 37 (1978). See also Big Brother 
Watch & Others v. UK, App. No. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/1, ECLI:CE:E
CHR:2018:0913JUD005817013, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-186048. 
102 For example, the CJEU noted that “the need for protection against arbitrary or 
disproportionate intervention by public authorities in the sphere of the private 
activities of any person, whether natural or legal, constitutes a general principle 
of Community law.” And “for the purposes of determining of the scope of this 
principle regard must be had to the case law of the Court of Human Rights.” 
Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur General de la Concurrence, 2002 
E.C.R. I-9011
103 Directive 2002/58/EC aims at protecting the fundamental rights of natural persons 
as users of public electronic communication services, as well as legal persons 
as subscribers to public electronic communication services. Directive 2002/58/
EC, supra note 28, at recital 12. See also ePrivacy Proposal 2017, supra note 
1, at recital 7. 
104 See, e.g., id. at art. 1(1). 
105 GDPR, supra note 24, at art. 4(1). 
106 Id. at recital 14. However, sometimes data about a legal person can be data about 
an individual (personal data) too, for instance when one person runs a company. 
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Confidentiality of communications is crucial for companies — but the 
GDPR might not offer them protection. For example, if a company sends an 
electronic message to buy stocks on the stock market, and no personal data 
are involved in that communication, the communication could be outside the 
GDPR’s scope. But the company has an interest in keeping that communication 
confidential. The ePrivacy rules protect such interests, because they also 
protect business communication. 
In conclusion, under both the ECHR and EU law, communication is protected, 
regardless of its nature. It makes sense that the right to communications 
confidentiality protects more than only private communications. If only 
private communication were protected, it would be necessary to access the 
communication to determine whether or not it deserves protection. Then, the 
content of communication would already be disclosed, thereby infringing 
privacy and confidentiality. Considering the values behind communications 
confidentiality — privacy, freedom of expression, and trust in communication 
services — the law should indeed protect all communication technologies, 
regardless of the nature of the information which is exchanged.
C. Content Only or Metadata Too?
Should the right to communications confidentiality protect only content, or 
also metadata? Originally, the state postal company was not allowed to open 
letters — but had to read the address data to deliver the letter. The content of 
the communication therefore seems more sensitive than the metadata. However, 
in the context of electronic communications, metadata can be exceedingly 
sensitive. Nowadays, service providers process a lot of metadata to provide their 
services. These metadata can be sensitive, are easily processed and analyzed, 
and may give detailed insights into people’s communications, interests and 
behavior. Does the right of communications confidentiality protect metadata?
1. Article 8 of the ECHR
Metadata are protected by the ECtHR under Article 8 of the ECHR. The 1984 
Malone case concerned “metering” records, metadata about phone calls. The 
ECtHR ruled that Article 8 of the ECHR protects such metadata: “the records 
of metering contain information, in particular the numbers dialled, which is 
an integral element in the communications made by telephone.”107 
In the Malone case, the ECtHR distinguished the processing of metadata 
(metering records) from intercepting communication, because the telephone 
operator may legitimately obtain metadata, for instance to ensure that the 
107 See Malone v. United Kingdom, 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984). 
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subscriber is correctly charged. As a result, the ECtHR subjected the interference 
with metadata to a less strict test. The ECtHR used a similar approach in the 
case P.G & J.H. of 2002.108 
Malone and P.G & J.H. concerned phone records, but in the Copland 
case of 2007, the ECtHR confirmed that Article 8 of the ECHR also protects 
metadata regarding email and internet usage.109 It is generally assumed that 
all metadata will be protected under Article 8 of the ECHR, regardless of the 
communication technology used. 
In sum, metadata are protected under art. 8 ECHR, but when assessing 
an interference the ECtHR works from the assumption that capturing 
communications metadata will normally constitute a less serious infringement 
than capturing communications content. To some extent, that distinction is 
understandable, because some metadata need to be processed by the service 
provider in order to provide the service. 
2. EU Law
In recent years, the CJEU has delivered important judgments on metadata. In 
2014, the CJEU declared the Data Retention Directive invalid in its Digital 
Rights Ireland judgment.110 That directive obliged member states to adopt 
laws that require telecom and internet access providers to retain metadata of 
all their customers for a period of up to two years, for intelligence and law 
enforcement purposes. 
The CJEU invalidated the directive because it interfered disproportionately 
with the EU Charter’s privacy and data protection rights, and did not provide 
sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse. The CJEU noted that such 
metadata retention “is likely to generate in the minds of the persons concerned 
the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant surveillance.”111 
After this judgment of the CJEU, many member states withdrew their 
national data retention laws.112 However, some member states, including 
Sweden and the UK, kept national data retention laws in place. National 
courts in those two countries asked the CJEU whether such national data 
108 P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 
109 See Copland v. United Kingdom, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
110 Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others 
v. Ireland, 2014 E.C.R. 54.
111 See id. at ¶ 37.
112 Mark Cole & Franziska Boehm, Data Retention After the Judgement of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (June 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10993/17500.
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retention laws were allowed under EU law. In the Tele 2/Watson case,113 the 
CJEU ruled, roughly summarized, that EU member states are not allowed to 
impose a blanket obligation on telecom and internet access providers to store 
metadata of all users of electronic communication services. According to the 
CJEU, such mass metadata retention, even if it aims to help catch criminals 
or terrorists, is disproportional, and therefore violates people’s privacy and 
data protection rights. 
The CJEU added that metadata enable “establishing a profile of the 
individuals concerned, information that is no less sensitive, having regard to 
the right to privacy, than the actual content of communications.”114 Moreover, 
mass metadata surveillance threatens the right to receive and impart information: 
the retention of metadata can “have an effect on the use of means of electronic 
communication and, consequently, on the exercise by the users thereof of their 
freedom of expression, guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter.”115 
The CJEU confirmed this approach in the Schrems case, in which it 
invalidated the “Safe Harbor” decision that formed an important legal basis 
for the export of personal data to companies in the United States. According 
to the CJEU, the Commission’s decision was invalid, because the Commission 
did not sufficiently investigate whether the Safe Harbor scheme offered a level 
of protection for personal data equivalent to the protection in the EU. This 
investigation was necessary, since it appeared that U.S. intelligence agencies 
had access to communications and metadata on a massive scale. According to 
the CJEU, mass surveillance of communications content violates the “essence” 
of the right to privacy.116 If a law (such as the Data Retention Directive) 
infringes the essence of a right, that law is, by definition, illegal. In such a 
case, there is no need to assess whether the law constitutes a proportionate 
interference with a right. Hence, the CJEU makes a similar distinction between 
content and metadata as the ECtHR. Although metadata are protected under 
communications confidentiality, the CJEU sees metadata as normally less 
sensitive than content. 
A similar distinction between content and metadata is made in the ePrivacy 
Directive, under which communication providers may only process metadata 
if they meet strict rules. In principle, such providers are only allowed to 
process metadata for transmission and billing purposes, and only as long as 
this is necessary. Additionally, providers may process metadata after prior 
113 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele 2/Watson, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970. 
114 Tele 2/Watson, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, ¶ 99.
115 Id. at ¶ 101. 
116 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, 2015 
E.C.R. 117, ¶ 94. 
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consent of the individual, and only for a limited number of purposes.117 But 
providers are in principle not allowed to touch communications content 
without the permission of the users. The 2017 ePrivacy proposal makes a 
similar distinction between content and metadata. 
However, the distinction between content and metadata is coming increasingly 
under pressure. First, it is becoming harder to distinguish content from metadata. 
Second, content and metadata can be equally sensitive and revealing. For 
example, it is contentious whether the subject line of an email message should 
be regarded as content or metadata. And regarding web browsing, URLs can 
be seen as content or as metadata. A URL, such as <https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Theoretical_Inquiries_in_Law>, can provide information about 
content. Third, metadata are easier to analyze than communications content. 
Fourth, collecting metadata (rather than content) enables parties to capture 
data about millions of people, because storing metadata is usually cheaper 
than storing content. 
In conclusion, under the ECHR and under EU law, metadata are granted 
protection, but normally less than the communications content. This difference 
can partly be explained by the fact that communication service providers must 
process some metadata to provide their services. The law is still developing 
regarding the distinction between content and metadata, and how the law 
should deal with that distinction requires more research and debate.
D. Protection after Transmission of Communications? 
Does the right to communications confidentiality also apply after 
communications are transported or transmitted? As noted above, the right to 
communications confidentiality is historically connected to the state postal and 
telecommunications monopoly. This state monopoly made communications 
more vulnerable to interception during transport. Nowadays, communication 
has also become vulnerable outside of the strict transport phase. For example, 
communication is often stored on servers of communication service providers. 
Such developments raise the question whether communications confidentiality 
should also protect communication outside of the transport phase. 
1. Article 8 of the ECHR
Older case law took the position that the protection of “correspondence” under 
Article 8 of the ECHR ended after delivery of the letter.118 The underlying 
117 See Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 28, at arts. 5-6, 9. 
118 See, e.g., G., S. & M. v. Austria, App. No. 9614/81, 34 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 
& Rep. 119 (1983).
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assumption seemed to be that correspondence only needs extra protection 
during transport by the state postal company. Considering the historical 
background of the right to communications confidentiality, the assumption 
was defendable before the state monopoly was abolished. 
However, in 1992 the ECtHR extended the protection to communications 
after the transport phase. In the Niemietz case, the ECtHR applied article 
8 for the first time to letters after delivery.119 The case involved business 
correspondence that was obtained by the police during a search at the recipient’s 
home. And in the 2013 Bernh Larsen Holding case, the ECtHR gave a similar 
broad protection to digital communications stored on a company server. In 
this case, the Norwegian tax authorities had ordered a company to provide a 
copy of all data stored on a shared server. The ECtHR said: “The imposition 
of that obligation on the applicant companies constituted an interference with 
their ‘home’ and undoubtedly concerned their ‘correspondence’ and material 
that could properly be regarded as such for the purposes of Article 8.”120 
The above case-law shows that Article 8 of the ECHR also protects 
communications after the transport has ended, regardless of the nature of 
the communication or the technology used. 
2. EU law
It may be assumed that Article 7 of the EU Charter also protects communications 
after transport. After all, the EU Charter offers at least the same protection as the 
ECHR. However, under the ePrivacy Directive, the status of communications 
after transport is less clear. The main confidentiality provision of the 
ePrivacy Directive (Article 5(1)) does not make it explicit whether it protects 
communications after transport. 
The ePrivacy Directive also aims to protect people’s communication devices, 
in Article 5(3). Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive protects information, 
and hence also communications, stored on a user’s device. The ePrivacy 
Directive assumes that people’s devices are part of their private sphere, and 
therefore deserve legal protection.121 
Roughly summarized, under Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive, parties 
can only store or access information on a user’s device if that user has consented 
to it. Article 5(3) applies, for instance, when a company copies somebody’s 
119 Niemietz v. Germany, 251-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
120 Bernh Larsen Holding AS and others v. Norway, CE:ECHR:2013:0314JUD002411708, 
¶ 106 (2013). For a discussion, see arnbak, supra note 11. 
121 Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 28, at recital 24. On the rationales for art. 5(3), 
see Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Personal Data Processing for Behavioural 
Targeting: Which Legal Basis?, 5 inT'l daTa PriVacy l. 163 (2015). 
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address book or emails from his or her phone.122 The provision also applies to 
cookies, because cookies constitute information that is stored on, or read from, 
a device. There are exceptions to the consent requirement, for instance for 
cookies (etc.) that are necessary for transmission or for a service requested by 
the user.123 Article 5(3) does not protect stored communications in the cloud.124 
Regarding communications after transmission, the legal situation under 
the 2017 ePrivacy proposal is similar to that under the ePrivacy Directive. It 
is unclear to what extent the main confidentiality provision (Article 5) of the 
ePrivacy proposal protects communication after transmission.125 Article 8 of 
the ePrivacy proposal protects information (including communications) that 
is stored on a user’s device — but does not protect communications stored 
in the cloud.
It is contentious to what extent the ePrivacy rules regarding communications 
confidentiality should protect communications after the transmission phase. 
European data protection authorities and others argue that communications 
should also be protected after transmission.126 The Article 29 Working Party 
(consisting of the 28 EU data protection authorities) says that a restriction to the 
transmission phase “is based on a conceptual framework of communications 
which is outdated.”127 The Article 29 Working Party adds: “communication 
between subscribers of the same cloud-based services (for instance webmail 
providers) will often entail only very little conveyance: sending a mail would 
mostly involve reflecting this in the database of the provider, rather than actually 
122 On copying a contact list, see Canadian and Dutch Data Privacy Guardians Release 
Findings from Investigation of Popular Mobile App, auToriTeiT PersoonsGeGeVens 
(Oct. 13, 2013), https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/news/canadian-and-
dutch-data-privacy-guardians-release-findings-investigation-popular-mobile-app.
123 Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 28, at art. 5(3). See also Eleni Kosta, Peeking 
into the Cookie Jar: The European Approach Towards the Regulation of Cookies, 
21 inT’l J.l. & info. Tech. 380 (2013).
124 Article 5(3) speaks of “terminal equipment”; that concept excludes cloud storage. 
“Terminal equipment” is defined in Directive 2008/63/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2008 on Competition in the Markets 
in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, art. 5(3), 2008 O.J. (L 162).
125 For comments on art. 5, see zuiderVeen borGesius eT al., supra note 94, at 
53-54.
126 European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion, supra note 4; Opinion of the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on the Proposed Regulation for the 
ePrivacy Regulation (2002/58/EC), 26, WP 247, 01/2017 (2017). See also 
zuiderVeen borGesius eT al., supra note 94, at 54-55.
127 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP247, at 26.
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sending communications between two parties.”128 Moreover, people that use 
communication services may not even realize whether their communications 
are in transit or stored. 
But businesses, especially Silicon Valley companies that provide over 
the top services such as webmail, have lobbied for limiting the ePrivacy 
Regulation’s scope of protection to the transmission phase. Such a limitation 
would put many over the top services outside of the scope of protection, 
because these services do not consist of conveying signals, but are delivered 
on top of communication networks (offered by, for instance, internet access 
providers). Many over the top service providers believe that the ePrivacy 
Regulation’s rules regarding electronic communications are too strict. 
We think that the ePrivacy Regulation should, at a minimum, protect 
communications when a service provider stores them in the cloud as part of the 
communication service. Many service providers, such as webmail providers, 
store people’s communications by default after the transmission phase (in the 
narrow sense) has ended. This storage could be seen as a form of extended 
transmission. Hence, it makes sense to extend the protection until after the 
transmission phase, also because there are similar trust issues at stake as in 
the context of more traditional communication services.
We do not believe that the protection of the GDPR is sufficient for 
communications outside of the strict transmission phase, as some Silicon 
Valley companies seem to suggest. First, the GDPR only protects personal 
data relating to identifiable natural persons, which means that the GDPR 
would not protect all communications. For instance, some business-to-business 
communications may not be tied to personal data. We saw, however, that 
human rights case law on confidentiality of communications does require 
protection of business communications. 
Second, the GDPR is written for all kinds of situations and contains open and 
relatively lenient norms, which are not tailored to protecting communications. 
For example, in many situations, the GDPR allows a company to process 
personal data (including communications that qualify as personal data) without 
the individual’s consent. To illustrate: a company can process personal data if, 
in short, it has a legitimate interest to use the data, and that interest overrides 
the individual’s interests.129 In consideration of the human rights and trust 
issues at stake, it is more appropriate to have a regime (as in the ePrivacy 
Directive) that prohibits interference with communications, unless under 
narrowly defined specific circumstances, or when the individual has given 
prior consent. 
128 Id. at 26.
129 GDPR, supra note 24, at art. 6(1)(f). 
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In sum, the right to communications confidentiality also applies after 
the transport or transmission of the communication has ended. The rules in 
the ePrivacy Regulation should also protect communications outside of the 
transmission phase. 
conclusIon
In this Article, we have discussed the right to communications confidentiality 
in Europe, to assess whether communications confidentiality requires extra 
protection, in separate rules, in addition to the GDPR. 
We have seen that the right to communications confidentiality protects 
not only privacy-related interests, but also other interests which are more 
related to freedom of expression. Moreover, the right to communications 
confidentiality protects the trust that society as a whole has in communication 
services. Protecting that trust was important when the state had a postal and 
telecommunications monopoly. Nowadays, communication services are 
mostly offered by companies. But trust in communication services remains 
essential for communications, commercial transactions, e-government, and 
participation in democratic processes. 
Because the right to communications confidentiality protects different 
values than the rights to privacy and to personal data protection, it has a 
different scope. The right protects not only private communications, but all 
communications, regardless of their nature and regardless of the technology 
used. 
Some aspects of the right to communications confidentiality remain 
controversial. For instance, metadata can be just as sensitive as communications 
content — but how the law should protect metadata requires more research 
and debate. Another controversial topic is to what extent the right should 
offer protection after the transmission phase. Since trust in communication 
services is one of the core values protected by the right, it makes sense to 
protect communications and metadata in the cloud. 
We conclude that separate protection of confidentiality of communications, 
next to the GDPR, is justified and necessary. An adequate protection of 
confidentiality of communications is crucial — not only for individuals, but 
for society as a whole.
